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It is a crisp, autumn Friday night in the United States.  We eagerly watch as the high school 
football game is about to begin. 
The players kneel before their game to say a prayer for good luck and safety.  It may sound 
like this:   
O God, you gave us bodies— 
as well as minds and hearts— 
with which to praise and worship you. 
Our sports and exercises are a fitting use of gifts 
and talents you have given us. 
Bless our workouts and the games we play, 
and those with whom we exercise or compete. 
Give us strength, endurance, courage 
and agility as we compete or train. 
Keep us safe and healthy as we celebrate 
our physical and mental skills in sport.1 
 
Throughout the game, as the players score, they may say a quick celebratory prayer in the 
endzone or kiss their hand and raise their pointer finger up to the sky expressing, gesturing, and 
symbolizing “Thank you, God.”  With two minutes left in the game and a tied score, the 
quarterback for the home team throws a “Hail Mary” pass2 to win the game. 
Religion and sports are inextricably linked.  There is a long, intertwined history between 
religion and sport.  However, while there is widespread recognition of the influence that religion 
has in sport, the history between the two areas is not without conflict.  Pre-game “rituals,” such as 
prayers and gestures of worship, are regularly held before and during athletic contests, particularly 
football games, in the United States.3  Pre-game prayers are held in public school locker rooms or 
 
1 A Prayer for Those Involved in Sports, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY, https://www.marquette.edu/faith/prayers-
sports.php. 
2 Hail Mary Pass, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (“a long forward pass in football thrown into or near the end zone in a last-
ditch attempt to score as time runs out — often used figuratively.”), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Hail%20Mary (last visited November 26, 2019). 
3 Gill Fried & Lisa Bradley, Applying the First Amendment to Prayer in A Public University Locker Room: An Athlete’s 
and Coach’s Perspective, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 301 (1994). 
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on sidelines prior to the start of an athletic contest.  Absent a complaint by a concerned student-
athlete or parent to the coach, team, or school, these rather routine rituals are rarely met with 
resistance and often undertaken without any thought to its legal consequences.  However, 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century, courts, including the Supreme Court of the 
United States, were replete with constitutional challenges addressing the extent to which religious 
devotional practices should be permitted in the government sector and in public schools.4  In 
particular, and as the central focus of this paper, there are the constitutional challenges addressing 
the extent to which religious devotional prayer should be permitted in public-school athletics.  In 
resolving these challenges, the Supreme Court has held that such pre-game prayers and prayer 
policies may violate the Establishment Clause.5  As a result, the Supreme Court has limited the 
role religion plays in public-school athletic contests. 
The First Amendment protects student-athletes by providing them the right to be free from 
state imposed religious indoctrination as well as the right to free exercise and free speech as it 
relates to religious devotional prayer.  In some circumstances, this constitutional protection is also 
balanced against a coach’s right to effectively motivate their team without having every word 
scrutinized as a government actor.  The Religion Clauses – the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause – are incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
 
4 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (holding that a state’s “Sunday Closing Laws” were secular 
in nature and did not violate the Establishment Clause because they gave the citizens a secular day of rest); Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983) (holding that the state legislature’s practice of opening each legislative sessions 
with a prayer delivered by a chaplain paid from state funds did not violate the Establishment Clause); Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (holding that a statute which forbade an employer’s dismissal 
of an employee who refused to work on his Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 566-67 (2014) (holding that the town’s 
practice of opening board meetings with a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause; the First Amendment did 
not require legislative prayer to be nonsectarian, nor was the town required to search beyond its borders for non-
Christian prayer givers in order to achieve religious balancing). 
5 See Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a policy permitting student-led, 
student-initiated prayer at high school football games violated the Establishment Clause). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.6  There is a symbiotic tension between the Religion Clauses.7  The 
Establishment Clause “protects every individual’s right to freedom of belief while the Free 
Exercise Clause protects the individual’s freedom to practice his [or her] religion.”8  Although 
these clauses may appear to be straightforward, courts have had substantial difficulty deciding 
where to draw the line between permissible religious actions and those that violate the Religion 
Clauses.9  In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the language of the Religion Clauses is 
“at best opaque, particularly when compared with other portions of the amendment.”10   
Historically, one of the main issues under the Establishment Clause is the separation of church 
and state in the realm of education, specifically in the public-school system.11  Accordingly, courts 
have widely scrutinized religion in public schools under the Establishment Clause.12  Courts 
remain unconcerned with the actions of individual students, such as students voluntarily praying 
anytime throughout the school day.13  However, the free exercise rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution are violated when government actors, such as school administrators, sponsor a 
specific religious practice of prayer.14  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has determined that the 
 
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof …”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,18 (1947) (holding that a New Jersey law providing 
public payment of the costs of transportation to and from parochial Catholic schools is not in violation of the 
Establishment Clause). 
7 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 50 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (stating that establishment and free exercise “were correlative 
and coextensive ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental freedom.”); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (recognizing an internal tension in the First Amendment between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause). 
8 Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1316 n.20 (D.C. N.J. 1977). 
9 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971) (“The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter 
for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement 
are inevitable, lines must be drawn.”); see also Sara S. Davis, Separation of Church and State: Expanding the Purpose 
Prong of the Lemon Test, 53 FLA. L. REV. 603 (2001). 
10 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
11 DAVID M. ALEXANDER & KERN ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC-SCHOOL LAW 202 (5th ed. 2001). 
12 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
13 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 313. 
14 Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (an oversight from school administration can be deemed 
endorsement, encouragement, or participation); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teachers should be 
prohibited from participating in religious exercises because students view teachers as role models). 
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free exercise of religion will not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the 
Establishment Clause in governmental settings.15  The relationship between the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause is made even more complicated when student-athletes and 
coaches exercise their religious beliefs by praying at a public-school athletic contest.   
Prayer in public-school athletic contests may sometimes conflict with the Religion Clauses 
because sidelines and locker rooms serve as modern-day pews for some student-athletes and 
coaches.  In most cases, the player’s interest in practicing his or her religion is weighed against a 
coach’s right to motivate his or her team or a mandated school prayer policy.  These interests and 
rights must be examined in light of any action undertaken by a government or government actor 
to determine if those actions constitute the establishment of religion by the state or the infringement 
of a player’s right to freely exercise religious devotional prayer.  Despite the seeming discord 
between the Religion Clauses, both free exercise and non-establishment can be achieved through 
the proper implementation of a moment of silence policy in public-school athletic contests.  A 
moment of silence would be voluntary, uncoerced, and neutral for the secular purpose of furthering 
individualized reflection prior to the start of public-school athletic contests.  This practice would 
not violate the Free Exercise Clause as it neither impinges on a student-athlete’s rights nor curtails 
a coach’s right to effectively motivate his or her team.  Moreover, this practice would not violate 
the Establishment Clause as such a policy cannot be misconstrued as endorsing a particular 
religious practice.   
This paper will examine the history of religion in sport; the framework and application of the 
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and its free speech implications, especially in the 
context of religious devotional prayer in public schools; and the solution to achieving both free 
 
15 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
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exercise and non-establishment through the proper implementation of a moment of silence policy 
in public-school athletic contests.   
II. Muscular Christianity 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the convergence of religion and organized sports became 
integral to the American lifestyle with the movement referred to as “Muscular Christianity.”  
Muscular Christianity is simply defined as the “Christian commitment to health and manliness.”16  
The origins of muscular Christianity can be traced back to Paul the Apostle and the New 
Testament, which affirms manly exertion17 and physical health.18  However, this ideology was not 
always a central tenet of Christianity.   
The Muscular Christianity movement originated in nineteenth century Victorian England 
amidst industrialization and urbanization.19  This theological offshoot proposed the idea that male 
physical perfectibility was a paradigm for religion and social order.20  The term “Muscular 
Christianity” most likely first appeared as a literary term in an 1857 English review of Charles 
Kingsley’s novel Two Years Ago (1857).21  Much of Kingsley’s work reflected his commitment to 
the political enfranchisement of the working class during the Industrial Revolution in Great 
Britain.22  One year later, the same phrase was used to describe Tom Brown’s School Days, an 
1856 novel about life at “Rugby School” by fellow Englishman Thomas Hughes.23  Hughes wrote, 
 
16 See generally Clifford Putney, Muscular Christianity, INFED.ORG, (2003). 
www.infed.org/christianeducation/muscular_christianity.htm. 
17 Mark 11:15 (English Standard) (“When they arrived in Jerusalem, Jesus entered the temple courts and began to 
drive out those who were buying and selling there. He overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of 
those selling doves.”). 
18 1 Cor. 6:19-20 (English Standard) (“Do you not know that your bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, who is in 
you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore, honor God 
with your bodies.”); see also Putney, supra note 16. 
19 See Phillip J. Sweitzer, Drug Law Enforcement in Crisis: Cops on Steroids, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 193, 211 (2004). 
20 Id. at 210. 





“muscular Christians hold [to] the old chivalrous and Christian belief, that a man’s body is given 
him to be trained and brought into subjection, and then used for the protection of the weak, the 
advancement of all righteous causes, and the subduing of the earth which God has given to the 
children of men.”24  Soon after, the press referred to both writers and their genre of novels rife 
with moral principles and manly Christian heroes, as “muscular Christians.”25 
Hughes and Kingsley critiqued that Christianity, and specifically the Anglican church, had 
been weakened by effeminacy.26  Society was worried that religion had become over effeminized 
due to increases in both male employment in white-collar jobs and female involvement in Christian 
churches.27  Kingsley’s work, in turn, greatly influenced the Victorian fundamentalist theologian 
Charles Haddon Spurgeon.28  Through their work, the central tenet of Muscular Christianity was 
realized.29  Spurgeon exerted great influence over emerging American muscular Christians, such 
as an evangelist and publisher D. L. Moody, and pioneer psychologist G. Stanley Hall.30  Hall 
pointed to the imbalance of women to men in the pews as evidence that there existed a “woman 
peril” in American Protestant churches.31  They also contended that women’s influence in church 
had led to “an overabundance of sentimental hymns, effeminate clergymen and sickly-sweet 
images of Jesus.”32  Critics argued that such characteristics were revolting to “real men” and 
insisted that men would avoid church until feminized Protestantism gave way to Muscular 





27 See Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says . . . A Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 848-49 (2006). 
28 Sweitzer, supra note 19. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 





Athletics, which developed “physical presence, stoic courage in the endurance of pain, and 
judgment under pressure,” were purposefully praised as the antidote to these weaknesses by 
making religion a manly endeavor. 34  Based on this theory and spurred on by the moral corruption 
of cities during the Industrial Revolution, organized youth sports were first introduced to young 
boys as means of socialization and education.35  Muscular Christianity eventually found its way 
into mainstream American life in the form of the Young Men’s Christian Association (“YMCA”) 
and the Boy Scouts.36   
In fact, Spurgeon was largely responsible for introducing the YMCA to the United States.37  
The YMCA was one of the first organizations devoted to youth sports as a way to “nurture the 
healthy development of children … [and] strengthen families” through important social values, 
such as “caring, honesty, respect and responsibility” found in sports.38  The first American branch 
opened in Boston in 1851; in 1866, the New York branch added a gymnasium.39  The YMCA 
fostered an environment not only for the integration of sports and societal values, but also the 
creation of sports themselves.  For example, in 1891, muscular Christian James Naismith invented 
basketball while studying at a YMCA in Springfield, Massachusetts.40   Soon after, the YMCA 
invented volleyball and sponsored hiking, biking, baseball, and rowing clubs.41   
 
34 Buzuvis, supra note 27, at 849; see also Mystic Seaport, The Protestant Work Ethic, (October 12, 2019) (“Nothing 
brought down the wrath of ministers and lay people quicker than the ‘sin’ of idleness.  Honest labor could bring a 
person closer to God than any other world action, except of course, prayer.”). 
35 See Jenni Spies, Only Orphans Should Be Allowed To Play Little League:* How Parents Are Ruining Organized 
Youth Sports for Their Children and What Can Be Done About It, * Telephone Interview with Gary Spies, Former 
President, Loyalsock Township Little League, (Oct. 10, 2004).,13 SPORTS LAW. J. 275, 276 (2006). 
36 Lisa Miller, Manliness is Next to Godliness, NY MAG, (Aug. 31, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/sports/tebow-
sanchez/tim-tebow-christianity-2012-9/. 
37 Putney, supra note 16. 
38 Spies, supra note 35. 
39 Sweitzer, supra note 19, at 212-13. 
40 Miller, supra note 36. 
41 Putney, supra note 16. 
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In the latter half of the 20th century, advocates within the Muscular Christianity movement 
began boxing, viewing sports as a way to increase a man’s physical and moral strength.42  In fact, 
former President Theodore Roosevelt was a firm advocate of the movement out of fear that 
American men would lose their masculinity.43  Roosevelt boxed throughout college and his 
Presidency.44  On the sport of boxing, he once stated: 
The men who take part in these fights are as hard as nails, and it is not worthwhile 
to feel sentimental about their receiving punishment which as a matter of fact they 
do not mind. Of course, the men who look on ought to be able to stand up with the 
gloves, or without them, themselves; I have scant use for the type of sportsmanship 
which consists merely in looking on at the feats of someone else.45 
 
Roosevelt viewed factors such as urbanization, sedentary office jobs, and non-Protestant 
immigration as threats not only to men’s health and manhood but also to their privileged social 
standing.46  To maintain such social standing, Roosevelt urged “old stock” Americans to embrace 
a “strenuous life” replete with athleticism and aggressive male behavior.47  Accordingly, 
supporters urged their churches to abandon the tenets of “feminized” Protestantism.48 
The zenith of Muscular Christianity in America lasted from about the 1880s to the early 
1930s.49  Muscular Christianity was later met with resistance from Protestant leaders, such as 
Harry Emerson Fosdick, who held this theological branch responsible for encouraging militarism, 
and satirists, such as Sinclair Lewis, who disparaged Muscular Christianity in their writings.50  By 
the 1930s the Neo-Orthodoxy of Reinhold Niebuhr, who preached that divinity flourished not in 
 
42 Iulia Taranu, MMA Fighting is a Right Worthy of Protection Under the First Amendment, 6 Ariz. St. Sports & Ent. 











men’s muscles, but with God, became increasing popular in Protestant churches.51   However, 
Muscular Christianity still remains a part of the Catholic Church and various Protestant and 
Evangelical Christian groups.52  The Catholic Church promotes muscular Christianity in school 
athletic programs of schools, such as Notre Dame.53  Other Christian groups, such as the 
Fellowship of Christian Athletes,54 also still supports the combination of physical and spiritual 
development.55   
The Muscular Christianity theological movement undoubtedly has had a sustained impact on 
how society views the relationship between sport and religion, as the intersection of the two areas 
give rise to constitutional challenges to this day.  Today, athletes such as football’s Tim Tebow,56 
basketball’s Jeremy Lin,57 baseball’s Josh Hamilton, and boxer Manny Pacquiao, have all 
exemplified Muscular Christianity through sharing their faith with their fans.58  The pervasive 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id.; see also Miller, supra note 36 (“Groups like Promise Keepers, an Evangelical Christian parachurch organization 
for men since has “attempted to lure men back into the fold by emphasizing their duties as husbands and fathers—
traditional “manly” roles. The group’s revival meetings are often held in sports arenas.”). 
53 Putney, supra note 16. 
54 See Vision and Mission, THE FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN ATHLETES, https://www.fca.org/aboutus/who-we-
are/vision-mission (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (The Fellowship of Christian Athletes is an international non-profit 
Christian sports ministry emphasizing faith and sports. The ministry’s vision is “To see the world transformed by 
Jesus Christ through the influence of coaches and athletes.”). 
55 Putney, supra note 16. 
56 Christine Thomasos, Tim Tebow Brings in a New Wave of Christian Athleticism, The Christian Post (Oct. 20, 
2011), https://www.christianpost.com/news/tim-tebow-brings-in-a-new-wave-of-christian-athleticism-58871/ 
(“Tebow inspired a new term by ESPN, known as ‘muscular Christianity.’ The QB showcases his faith by wearing 
bible verses on his face, tweeting scriptures and publicly admitting his love for Jesus Christ, while drawing fans’ 
attention on the football field.”); see also Tim Tebow, Through My Eyes, (2011) (“Christians don’t have to be weak, 
either in mind, body, or soul.”). 
57 Mary Jane Dunlap, KU professor researching Naismith, religion and basketball, KANSAS UNIVERSITY, (Mar. 13, 
2012), http://today.ku.edu/2012/03/13/ku-professor-researching-naismith-religion-and-basketball (“Less well-known 
is that his game also was meant to help build Christian character and to inculcate certain values of the muscular 
Christian movement.  Although times have changed, there are analogies between the beliefs and activities of 19th-
century sports figures such as James Naismith and Amos Alonzo Stagg, a Yale divinity student who pioneered football 
coaching, and those of 21st-century athletes such as Tim Tebow and Jeremy Lin.”). 
58 Miller, supra note 36 (“The scholarly term for this theology—which is also practiced by Jeremy Lin, boxer Manny 
Pacquiao, and baseball’s Josh Hamilton—is ‘muscular Christianity,’ and it can be traced back to a Victorian-era 
phenomenon in which elite British and American Protestants, concerned that their boys were becoming pale and 
flaccid singing hymns in church congregations dominated by women, promoted a version of Christianity that stressed 
athleticism and fortitude, cold-water swims and pre-dawn calisthenics.”). 
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nature of Muscular Christianity has influenced athletes and coaches alike.  It is only when student-
athletes and coaches exercise their religious beliefs in the context of a public-school athletic contest 
that constitutional concerns come to the forefront.  Accordingly, this conflict can be best examined 
through the eyes of the First Amendment’s Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses. 
III. Constitutional Framework 
A. Judicial Standards for Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
     The Founding Father’s purpose of the Establishment Clause was to keep church and state 
separate as Thomas Jefferson referred to this Clause as “building a wall between church and 
State.”59  To help ensure a degree of separation between church and state, a metaphoric wall has 
been created by the courts.60  The Supreme Court emphasizes that this erected wall “must be kept 
high and impregnable.”61 
     However, some relation between state and religion is inevitable.  The Supreme Court 
recognizes that complete separation of church and state is inconceivable because “no institution 
[in society] can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much 
less from government.”62 
     The Establishment Clause63 requires the state to be “neutral in its relations with groups of 
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.  State 
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions then it is to favor them.”64  Essentially, the 
 
59 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,17 (1947) (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’”); see also Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879) (citing Jefferson’s reply to an address by the Danbury Baptist Association). 
60 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445-46 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
61 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
62 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
63 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985) (imposing the limitations of the 
Establishment Clause on states and their political subdivisions through the Fourteenth Amendment); Abington Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussion of the history of the incorporation 
of the Establishment Clause). 
64 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
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clause prohibits government from endorsing or disapproving of  specific religion or religious 
activity.65  It is well-established that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that the 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or act in a 
way which establishes a state religion or religious faith or tends to do so.66  Accordingly, the 
principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the 
fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.67 
     While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence includes several tests for analyzing the validity of 
government action under the Establishment Clause, there is no single test that has been determined 
to be controlling in every case.  As a result, the Court’s use of such various tests creates 
inconsistency and uncertainty in predicting the analysis and outcome of a given challenge.  Despite 
this, the Court has expressed its refusal “to be confined to any single test or criterion in this 
sensitive area.”68  While the Court refuses to be confined, the underlying principle of the 
Establishment Clause remains the same; the clause prohibits government from appearing to take a 
position on questions of religious belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any 
way to a person’s standing in the political community.”69   
 
65 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (What is crucial is that a government practice does not 
have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion). 
66 See id. at 714  (Brennan, J., dissenting)  (…[i]f government is to remain scrupulously neutral in matters of religious 
conscience, as our Constitution requires, then it must avoid those overly broad acknowledgments of religious practices 
that may imply governmental favoritism toward one set of religious beliefs); Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-17 (“Neither a 
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another . . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate 
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa); see also Santa Fe Independent School District 
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 302 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
67 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
68 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679. 
69 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious 
institutions…[t]he second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”). 
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     In most Establishment Clause cases relating to public schools, courts have applied — either 
independently or in combination — the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the endorsement test.70  
Courts tend to view the tests as overlapping, interchangeable approaches.71  While there has been 
some guidance, it is rather difficult to predict what test courts will employ in evaluating cases 
relating to prayer in a public-school athletic contest.  On a scale from elementary school prayer to 
prayer opening legislative sessions, such pre-game prayer in public-school athletic contest cases 
will likely fall in between the two ends of the continuum.  Therefore, I will briefly evaluate each 
test and the applicable public-school Establishment Clause cases in turn. 
1. The Lemon Test 
     The three-pronged Lemon test has historically been the most prominent Establishment Clause 
test and remains instructive today.72  However, there has been increasing criticism over the use of 
the Lemon test in analyzing Establishment Clause issues.73 
     The Lemon test sets forth three principles that serve as a framework that courts use when 
analyzing if a specific government action violates the Establishment Clause.74  Courts have applied 
 
70 See discussion infra Section III.A.1-3. 
71 See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (labeling the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the 
endorsement test as the “three traditional tests” in Establishment Clause cases). 
72 See Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 302, 314 (2000) (explicitly affirming that Lemon is still 
good law while effectively applying the “endorsement test,” which slightly alters Lemon’s first two prongs). 
73 See generally Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 389 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the 
crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced.”); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that “[p]ersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged”); Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (noting that “this action once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the 
[Lemon] test,” and that there is a “tension in the Court’s use of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment Clause 
challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free exercise of religion.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lemon test has “not provided adequate standards for deciding 
Establishment Clause cases.”); Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (deriding “the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the blurred, indistinct, and variable 
barrier described in Lemon.”). 
74 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
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Lemon in many cases addressing prayer in education at various levels.75  Lemon held that a school 
district’s policy must survive a three-prong inquiry: (1) the policy must have a secular legislative 
purpose; (2) its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
and (3) the policy must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.76   
     The first prong of the test prompts a court to consider whether the government’s action has a 
secular purpose.77  This is regarded as a fairly low hurdle for the state.78  A government action is 
not secular if its “actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of” religion or a religious belief.79   In 
evaluating a secular purpose, the secular purpose articulated by the legislature must be sincere and 
not merely a sham.80  However, the statute need not have exclusively secular objectives.81  Rather, 
the focus is on neutrality.  The government only violates the “central Establishment Clause value 
of officially religious neutrality” when it acts with the perceived and predominant purpose of 
advancing religion.82  Courts give a great deal of deference to the government’s professed secular 
purpose.83  Accordingly, an action that has a partially secular purpose may still pass muster.84  For 
example, in the context of public education, a “moment of silence” law that was found to have 
been adopted for the purpose of encouraging school prayer was unconstitutional, even though a 
 
75 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-92 (1992) (focusing on the coercive nature of prayer at graduation, 
rather than explicitly applying the Lemon test affirmed earlier in the opinion); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314; Wallace, 
472 U.S. at 55; Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371 (applying the Lemon test in addition to the principles of coercion and 
endorsement, when evaluating prayer at the Virginia Military Institute). 
76 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
77 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
78 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372 (quoting Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
79 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. 
80 Id. at 64; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (“[W]hat is relevant is the legislative purpose 
of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.”). 
81 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 64.  
82 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005). 
83 See Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 302, 308 (2000); see also Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (“In 
evaluating the constitutionality of the supper prayer…we will accord…the benefit of all doubt and credit his 
explanation of the prayer’s purposes.”). 
84 See Deanna N. Pihos, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause at Public 
Universities, 90 CORNELL. L. REV. 1349, 1356 (2005). 
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“moment of silence” law, not found to have been adopted for this purpose, would be 
constitutionally permissible.85   
     The second prong prompts the court to consider whether the “principal or primary effect is one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”86  This prong evaluates whether the government favors 
or endorses religion or a particular religious belief regardless of the secular purpose originally 
professed.87  Case law suggests that this so-called “effects” prong is of utmost significance, yet 
difficult to categorize.88  While much of the government’s role inevitably has some effect on 
religion, the Court has advised that not every law that confers an “indirect, remote, or incidental” 
benefit upon religion is in and of itself constitutionally invalid.89  The Court has focused more 
heavily on challenges to aid to, rather than inhibition to, religion.  More specifically, the Court is 
concerned with financial aid to religious institutions, especially religious schools,90 and activities 
that communicate a message of official endorsement for particular religions or for religion in 
 
85 Only the amendment, which added “or prayer” to the list of what one could do during a moment of silence, was 
held unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (holding that a state statute that mandated a period of silence 
for mediation or prayer was unconstitutional); Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735 (5th Cir. 2009) ((holding that 
a state law that provides for a mandatory moment of silence to be observed in schools in which a student may, as the 
student chooses, reflect, pray, meditate, or engage in any other silent activity that is not likely to interfere with or 
distract another student is constitutional); Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Ouachita Parish, 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (a school 
prayer or meditation statute which had the sole purpose of returning verbal prayer in public schools was found to be 
unconstitutional).  
86 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
87 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
88 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (finding that the second prong of the Lemon test 
establishes that government programs which “neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without 
reference to religion” are not readily subject to Establishment Clause challenges); see also Eric Nasstrom, School 
Vouchers in Minnesota: Confronting the Walls Separating Church and State, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1065, 1084 
(1996). 
89 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 
(1973)). 
90 The Supreme Court has found neutral voucher and transportation programs to be constitutional. See, e.g., Zelman 
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (holding that a school voucher program did not violate the Establishment 
Clause when the program is enacted for a valid secular purpose that is entirely neutral towards religion and consists 
of a genuine, private choice, even if the vouchers could be used for private, religious schools); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1,18 (1947) (upholding a New Jersey law enabling a local school district to reimburse parents for the 
public transportation costs of sending their children to public and private schools, including parochial schools).  
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general.91  As a result, school policies or programs that rise to an endorsement or disparagement 
of a particular religion violate the Establishment Clause.92  However, neutral school policies or 
programs that are reinforced by a genuine, private choice may break any causal chain of a potential 
Establishment Clause violation. 
     The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional all state-sponsored religious practices in the 
public schools.  These include the recitation of a government-written, short, nondenominational 
prayer at the beginning of the school day,93 school-sponsored Bible reading,94 school-sponsored 
prayers at a school commencement,95  and the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in 
public-school classrooms.96  The Court has also declared unconstitutional state laws prohibiting 
 
91 See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a policy permitting 
student-led, student-initiated prayer at high school football games violated the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that a state statute that mandated a period of silence for mediation or prayer was 
unconstitutional); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that nonsectarian prayer at school graduation was 
unconstitutional). 
92 See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (holding school district’s policy of allowing student to give prayer at home 
football games violated Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (holding state practice 
only allowing teachers to teach creationism and prohibiting them from teaching evolutionism violated Establishment 
Clause because it acted as aid to Christian religion); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 
1995) (looking at whether using religious theme song will have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion).  
93 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (concluding that the prayers amounted to an “official stamp of 
approval” upon one particular kind of prayer and religious service, and said that, since teachers are agents of the 
federal government, the scheme violated the Establishment Clause). 
94 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); see also Roark v. South Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 573 
F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that distributing Bibles during public school sessions was unconstitutional). 
95 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (holding that an invocation and convocation during a high school graduation ceremony 
were unconstitutional). But see Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
graduation policy that permitted graduating students to vote on whether to have an unrestricted student led message 
at the beginning and close of graduation does not violate the Establishment Clause); Jones v. Clear Creek, 977 F.2d 
963 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a school district resolution that allowed senior high school 
students to make their own decision and vote on whether or not they wanted to allow student-led prayers at the school’s 
graduation); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding a university’s selection of a cleric or a 
university’s decision to include nonsectarian prayer or invocation at a ceremony not to be excessive entanglement); 
Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding a graduation policy that allowed student 
speakers to deliver a prayer or any other pronouncement); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that a graduation ceremony’s prohibition of playing Ave Maria in an instrumental version does not violate 
Establishment Clause). 
96 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980) (finding that the posting of religious texts on the wall serves no 
such educational function). 
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the teaching of evolution in the public schools97 and requiring the teaching of “creation science” 
where the school teaches evolution.98  
     The third and final prong of the Lemon test examines whether the government’s action creates 
“excessive government entanglement with religion.”99  Courts consider “the character and 
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the 
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.”100  The Court has 
primarily expressed concern with engaging in governmental activity that fosters political 
divisiveness along religious lines.101  This prong was articulated and applied by the Court in Lemon 
to hold unconstitutional a state program supplementing the salaries of parochial schoolteachers of 
secular subjects.102 
     It is important to note that except for the moment of silence case, which was rooted in the 
religious purpose prong of the Lemon test, all the other public-school cases focus on the religious 
effects prong.  More recently, a federal district court found that a school district’s affiliation with 
a religious organization such as the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, to raise money for a Christian 
mission trip to Guatemala to promote Christianity, failed each prong of the Lemon test.103  Lastly, 
as will be discussed in length later, the Supreme Court has ruled that a school district’s policy 
allowing student-initiated, student-led prayer prior to public school football games violated the 
Establishment Clause.104 
 
97 See Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
98 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
99 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
100 Id. at 615. 
101 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53-55 (1985); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24. 
102 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. But see Wood v. Arnold, 915 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that teaching Islam as part 
of a world history course in high school does not violate the Establishment Clause so long as the Lemon test is met). 
103 Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2018). 
104 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (concluding that the message was public 
speech authorized by government policy, taking place on government property at a government sponsored school 
event, which could be perceived as actual governmental endorsement of the prayer delivery at a school event). 
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2. The Endorsement Test 
     The endorsement test marginally alters the first two prongs of the Lemon test.105  Rather than 
solely focusing on the presence of a secular purpose, the crux of the analysis is whether the 
governmental actions convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.106  
Government may not endorse one religion over another or religion over nonreligion.107  
Accordingly, a government action that has the effect of endorsing religion, whether it intends to 
endorse or actually endorses a religion, violates the Establishment Clause regardless of its secular 
purpose.108  Justice O’Connor further explained government endorsement of a religion as 
“sending a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the  political community,” ultimately leading to the very political and religious divisiveness 
that the Establishment Clause aims to prevent.109   
3. The Coercion Test 
      Under the coercion test, if government action “coerces anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise,” the government has violated the Establishment Clause.110  The Supreme 
Court has considered the nature of the activity and the practical effect the government action had 
on the individuals involved.111  Prayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect 
 
105 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (the first introduction of the 
Endorsement Test); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97 (1989); (subsequently adopting the test); 
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 316 (confirming an increasing focus on the endorsing nature of state-sponsored prayer in a 
public institution context). 
106 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
107 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994). 
108 Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-32 (1962) (outlining the effects 
of government endorsement of a religion). 
109 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
110 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-92 (1992) (focusing on the coercive nature of prayer at graduation, rather 
than explicitly applying the Lemon test affirmed earlier in the opinion). 
111 Id. at 593 (recognizing “the undeniable fact … that the school district’s supervision and control of a … graduation 
ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, 
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.”). 
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coercion.112  While the concern may not be limited to the context of public-school education, it is 
most pronounced there.113  There are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience 
from the subtle coercive pressure that may be present in elementary and secondary public 
schools.114  Accordingly, due to the authoritative and influential environment of schools, the 
Supreme Court has relied on the coercion test in lower-level public-school prayer cases.115  In 
explaining the test, the Supreme Court has suggested that the coercion test’s scope of applicability 
may be limited to the context of elementary and secondary public schools.116 
B. Overview of the Free Exercise Clause and Implications for Free Speech 
A State “cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.” 117  The Free 
Exercise Clause protects the exercise or practice of one’s religious beliefs and prohibits the 
government from interfering with an individual’s religious practices.118  The Supreme Court has 
informed that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible” to 
others in order to warrant First Amendment protection.119  The Supreme Court has long recognized 
that the government may accommodate religious practices without violating the Establishment 
 
112 Id. (stating that psychological coercion “though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”); see 
also Engel, 370 U.S. at 429-32; Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
113 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
114 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (noting that prayer in the public-school context is more likely to convey the use of the 
state’s “machinery” to promote religion); Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003 (explaining that 
coercion is a consideration in the public-school context because “the expression of religious beliefs … carries the 
sanction and compulsion of the state’s authority.”); see also Abington, 374 U.S. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226, 261-262 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
115 See Peter E. Barber, Bishop v. Aronov: "No Talking in Class!"; Does the Elementary School Adage Apply to 
University Professors?, 44 ALA. L. REV. 211, 215 (1992). 
116 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (“We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the affected citizens are mature 
adults, but we think the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school 
children in this position.”). 
117 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,16 (1947). 
118 See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1990). 
119 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (quoting Thomas v. Rev. 
Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). 
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Clause.120  While the Religion Clauses often exert conflicting pressures, there is “room for play in 
the joints.”121  This room allows the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise 
requirements and without offense to the Establishment Clause.122  In essence, religion and 
government flourish because each is aware of the “corrosive perils of intrusive entanglements.”123  
Therefore, in exercising restraint in infringing on each other, the beneficiaries are a “diverse 
populace that enjoy religious liberty in a nation that honors the sanctity of that freedom.”124 
There is a fundamental difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and 
Free Exercise Clauses protect.125  The intersection between the Establishment, Free Exercise, and 
Free Speech Clauses is highlighted in Widmar v. Vincent.126  In Widmar, a student group sued the 
University of Missouri at Kansas City for the right to use state facilities for religious reasons under 
the free exercise and free speech clauses.127  The University excluded a student group named 
“Cornerstone” from use of its buildings based on one of its regulations denying use of college 
facilities “for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”128  The Court in Widmar 
rejected the university's argument that providing a forum for religious groups had the primary 
effect of advancing religion, and instead held that allowing the religious groups access to the forum 
would not unconstitutionally “endorse” religion.129  In affirming the circuit court, the Court first 
 
120 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-145 (1987).   
121 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 
669 (1970)). 
122 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
123 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 355 (2d Cir. 2003). 
124 Id. 
125 See Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). 
126 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
127 Id. at 265-66. 
128 Id. at 266. 
129 Id. at 270-75. 
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found that the University had created an open forum for its student groups.130  In addition to finding 
that First Amendment rights of speech extend to college campuses, and that religious worship and 
discussion are forms of protected speech, the Court determined that the University’s regulation 
was content-based because the students were excluded due to the religious content of their intended 
speech.131  In its reasoning on the Establishment Clause issue, the Court emphasized both that the 
open forum created by the University did not “confer any imprimatur of state approval” on religion 
and that the forum was open to over one hundred diverse student groups.132  The Court held that 
when a state university creates an open forum for student groups to meet, the Establishment Clause 
neither requires nor justifies excluding religious groups from the forum.133 The Court concluded 
that an equal access policy for a religious club when university facilities are open to all other 
student groups does not violate the Establishment Clause.134   Therefore, if a university creates a 
forum generally open for use by student groups, it cannot discriminate against groups based on the 
content of their speech.135 
In 1984 the Equal Access Act extended the reasoning of Widmar holding to public secondary 
schools.136  Under the Equal Access Act, a public secondary school with a “limited open forum” 
is prohibited from discriminating against students who wish to conduct a meeting within that forum 
on the basis of the “religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such 
 
130 Id. at 267 (finding that that content-based discrimination against religious speech without a compelling justification 
existed); see also Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1320 (8th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that “[a] neutral accommodation 
of the many student groups active at UMKC would not constitute an establishment of religion even though some 
student groups may use the University’s facilities for religious worship or religious teaching.”). 
131 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268-69. 
132 Id. at 274. 
133 Id. at 277. 
134 Id. at 263.  
135 Id. at 269-70. 
136 See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988). 
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meetings.”137  In analyzing the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act, the Supreme Court in 
Board of Education of the Westside Community School v. Mergens138 considered the 
constitutionality of student prayer groups.139  The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act 
based on its requirement that there be, “a limited open forum, the organization has to be a non-
curriculum related group, and state employees can only attend in a non-participatory capacity.”140  
While student clubs were encouraged, the school district prohibited clubs from having any sort of 
political or religious affiliation.141  In 1985, a group of students sought instatement of a Christian 
student club, whose activities included reading the Bible, praying together, and having 
fellowship.142  The school district denied the students’ request for instatement and the students 
brought a claim arguing that the school district’s refusal to allow the religious student group 
violated the Equal Access Act.143  The school district argued that the Act violated the 
Establishment Clause because individual legislators were motivated by a desire to protect and 
promote religious speech and worship in public schools.144  The Court rejected this argument, and 
instead declared that “what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly 
 
137 See 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 4071(a) and (b); see also 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071(b) (A “limited open forum” exists whenever a 
public secondary school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to 
meet on school premises during noninstructional time); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4072(3) (“Meeting” is defined to include those 
activities of student groups which are permitted under a school’s limited open forum and are not directly related to the 
school curriculum); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4072(4). (“Noninstructional time” is defined to mean time set aside by the school 
before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4072(2) 
(“Sponsorship” means the acting of promoting, leading, or participating in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, 
administrator, or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute sponsorship of the 
meeting); 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071(c)(3) (If the meetings are religious, employees or agents of the school or government 
may attend only in a nonparticipatory capacity). 
138 See Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990). 
139 Id. at 231-36. 
140 Id. at 233. 
141 Id. at 232. 
142 Id. at 232. 
143 Id. at 233 (explaining that the Equal Access Act “prohibits public secondary schools that receive federal financial 
assistance and that maintain a 'limited open forum' from denying ‘equal access’ to students who wish to meet within 
the forum on the basis of the content of the speech at such meetings”); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074. 
144 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249. 
24 
 
religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.”145  The Supreme Court applied the 
Lemon test and decided that construing the Equal Access Act to permit religious student groups 
does not violate the Establishment Clause because the Act has a secular purpose,146 the Act’s 
primary effect does not advance religion,147 and the Act does not excessively entangle government 
with religion.148  Therefore, the Court decided that the Equal Access Act did not violate the 
Establishment Clause and it was not unconstitutional for the school to have religious student 
groups.149 
IV. Discussion 
The Muscular Christianity movement has had a lasting impact on how society views the 
relationship between religion and sport.  Its emphasis on the combination of physical and spiritual 
development inspired organizations and student-athletes to adopt and promulgate its central tenet 
— a Christian commitment to health and manliness.150  The YMCA was founded on such 
principles and served as a vehicle to instill important social values in young children that may be 
realized through playing sports.151  Still today, such social values are professed by professional 
athletes who proselytize this faith with their fans.152  Muscular Christianity has widely influenced 
athletes and coaches alike in realizing the positive social values that result from an integration of 
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 248-49 (noting that “because the Act on its face grants equal access to both secular and religious speech, 
we think it clear that the Act’s purpose was not to ‘endorse or disapprove of religion.’”); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
147 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-52 (noting that high school students are unlikely to “confuse an equal access policy 
with state sponsorship of religion;” declaring that “[t]here is little if any risk of official state endorsement or 
coercion where no formal classroom activities are involved and no school officials actively participate. . . . To the 
extent that a religious club is merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs, students should 
perceive no message of government endorsement of religion.”). 
148 Id. at 252-53 (finding that school officials cannot lead or promote any religious exercises and being that the 
proposed religious student group was to have no teacher or faculty advisor, the policy did not violate this 
restriction). 
149 Id. at 253. 
150 See Putney, supra note 16. 
151 See Spies, supra note 35. 
152 See Thomasos supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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sport and religion.  However, its pervasive nature is also its Achilles heel, especially in the context 
of public-school education.  An aspect of public-school education that often gives rise to 
heightened concern is religious devotional prayer.153  Such concerns may arise where student-
athletes or public-school administration, such as teachers and coaches, seek to participate in 
student-led religious activity like pre-game team prayer.154  Subsequent challenges to these 
concerns usually highlight the play in the joints that exist between the Religion Clauses.155    
A. Student-Initiated/Led Prayer 
In non-public forums consisting of substantial public-school involvement in regulating school 
prayer through policy implementation, courts are likely to find that such involvement exceeds 
constitutional limits and violates the Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court addressed student-
led prayer at high school football games in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.156  In 
Santa Fe, the Court held that a Texas public high school policy that authorized a student election, 
the winner of which would lead a prayer at school football games, violated the Establishment 
Clause.157  The policy, initially entitled “Prayer at Football Games,”158 permitted students to cast 
 
153 See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (holding that a policy permitting 
student-led, student-initiated prayer at high school football games violated the Establishment Clause); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (holding that prayer at a public middle school graduation violated the 
Establishment Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (holding that the practice of hiring a chaplain 
to hold prayer at a state legislative session did not violate the Establishment Clause because of the country’s unique 
history); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (holding that school-sponsored Bible reading in 
public schools violates the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962) (holding that that reciting 
government-written prayers in public school classrooms violated the Establishment Clause). 
154 See Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that coach’s acts of participating in pre-game grace 
and pre-game prayer constitutes of violation of the Establishment Clause). 
155 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that a moment of silence in public schools for meditation 
or voluntary prayer violated the Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding the release 
of students from public school for religious instruction did not violate the Establishment Clause so long as the 
instruction takes place away from the school campus, for one hour per week, and with no public funding); People ex 
rel McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that religious instruction in public schools violates the 
Establishment Clause); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that regulations that required chapel 
attendance by cadets and midshipmen at federal military academies were invalid under the Establishment Clause). 
156 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (relying heavily upon Lee). 
157 Id. at 317. 
158 Id. at 297-98. As litigation was proceeding through the federal judicial system, the policy name was changed to 
omit the word “prayer.” However, a further election was not conducted to sanction this amended policy. 
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votes regarding two issues: (1) whether a student would deliver an “invocation and/or message” at 
football games; and (2) which student would deliver said message.159  The policy would allow a 
student to use the public address system to express the invocations.160  The students had voted 
affirmatively to allow the student-led invocations.161  Subsequently, some students filed suit 
against the school district for permitting prayer before the football games.162   
The Court found that the school district’s actions unequivocally fostered perceived and actual 
endorsement of religion for two main reasons.163  First, the pre-football invocations were given by 
a student who held the school-elected position of student council chaplain.164  While the school 
district argued that because the prayers were student-initiated and student-led, the prayers 
constituted private speech protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court concluded that the 
school district unsuccessfully attempted to disentangle itself from religious speech through the 
two-step student election process; in fact, the election itself was conducted because the board chose 
to permit student-led prayer.165  Second, the Court found that the invocations were authorized by 
the school and took place on government property at a government-sponsored school-related 
event.166  The Court found that the school district’s policy allowing the student council chaplain 
to give an invocation at the beginning of each home football was “invalid on its face because it 
establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpose and 
creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school 
 
159 Id. at 311. 
160 Id. at 306. 
161 Id. at 297-98. 
162 Id. at 294. 
163 Id. at 308. 
164 Id. at 309. 
165 Id. at 302-06. 
166 Id. at 303.  
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events.”167  The court reasoned that the school district’s elections were “insufficient safeguards of 
diverse student speech because fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote.”168  Moreover, 
the Court held that the plain language of the policy, which used words such as “solemnize” and 
“invocation” revealed that it had an unconstitutional purpose.169  The speech allowed under the 
policy could not truly be “private speech” because the policy highlighted “invocations,” defined 
by the Court as “primarily … an appeal for divine assistance.”170  Therefore, the Court found that, 
given the policy’s text and history, such invocations were not private student speech, but rather 
public speech because an objective Santa Fe High School student would perceive the pregame 
prayer as stamped with the school’s seal of approval.171   
With a particular emphasis on the intersection of speech and the Religion Clauses, the Court 
stated that not all speech given in government forums constitutes government-sponsored speech, 
particularly when the government has created an open forum or limited public forum for individual 
free speech.172  However, the Court found that the policy did not establish a limited public forum 
for “private speech.”173  Because the school authorized the election and the speech took place on 
school property at school events, the Court held that the speech was government-endorsed, rather 
than purely private speech. 174  The majority opinion stated: 
The delivery of such a message — over the school’s public address system, by a 
speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and 
 
167 Id. at 304, 317 (finding that the student majoritarian election process “guarantees, by definition, that minority 
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced.”). 
168 Id. at 305. 
169 Id. at 306-07, 314 (reasoning that “the expressed purposes of the policy encourage the selection of a religious 
message.”). 
170 Id. at 306-07. 
171 Id. at 308. 
172 Id.; see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894-95 (1995) (finding that an 
individual's contribution to a government-created forum, such as a person stating their opinion at a government-
sponsored public debate, did not constitute government sponsored speech). 
173 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 n.23 (2000). 
174 Id. at 302-03. 
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pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer 
— is not properly characterized as “private speech.”175   
 
Therefore, while the speech was ultimately delivered by a student, the school’s endorsement of the 
speech made it government speech for purposes of the Establishment Clause.176  Moreover, the 
Court found that it was not the intention of the school district to create a public forum for voluntary 
student speech as the policy did not evidence either “by policy or by practice, any intent to open 
the [pregame ceremony] to indiscriminate use, . . . by the student body generally.”177  Furthermore, 
the Court emphasized that the degree of school involvement in the prayer process made it clear 
that the invocations bear the imprint of the state and put the school-age children who objected in 
an untenable position.178  The court was persuaded that “the delivery of a pregame prayer has the 
improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”179  
Therefore, the Court found that any religious message resulting from the policy would be 
attributable to the school and not just to the student.180  Accordingly, the Court held that the 
enactment of the policy, “with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student 
prayer,” was a constitutional violation.181 
Remarkably, the Court stated that, “Of course, not every message delivered under such 
circumstances is the government’s own.”182  In fact, the Court recognized broad protection for 
voluntary student prayer in public schools as it did not hold that a school district can never create 
 
175 Id. at 310-312 (“Even if we regard every high school student's decision to attend a home football game as purely 
voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing 
those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 303 n.13 (“A conclusion that the District had created a public forum would help shed light on whether speech 
is public or private.”). 
178 Id. at 305. Additionally, the Court found that students feel social pressure to attend extracurricular activities, such 
as American high school football games. 
179 Id. at 312. 
180 Id. at 311. 
181 Id. at 316. 
182 Id. at 302. 
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a limited public forum for “private” student speech.  Significantly, the Court concluded that 
nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by the Court prohibits any public-school student from 
voluntarily praying before, during, or after the school day; the religious freedom is only infringed 
upon, as it was by the school district’s policy in Santa Fe, when the State affirmatively sponsors 
the particular religious practice of prayer.183   
B. Coach Initiated/Led Prayer 
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the constitutional limits of coach 
led prayer in public-school athletics in Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District.184  In 
1988, Doe was enrolled as a seventh-grade student who qualified for the girls’ basketball team.185  
The coach included the Lord’s Prayer in each basketball practice and the team said prayers in the 
locker rooms before games began, after games in the center of the basketball court in front of 
spectators, and on the school bus travelling to and from games.186  The coach initiated or 
participated in these prayers as had been a tradition for almost twenty years.187  Doe initially 
participated in the prayers so she would fit in with her teammates, but then decided not to 
participate.188  Her lack of participation attracted attention from her peers and spectators as well as 
a teacher who referred to Doe as a “little atheist.”189 
Doe filed an application for a restraining order and a preliminary injunction forbidding the 
school from allowing its employees from “leading, encouraging, promoting, or participating in 
 
183 Id. at 313. 
184 Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995). 







prayer with or among students during curricular or extra-curricular activities, including sporting 
events.”190  The district court enjoined the school district, its employees and its agents from 
leading, encouraging, promoting, or participating in prayers with or among students 
during curricular or extracurricular activities, including before, during, or after 
school-related sporting events. Students, however, are not enjoined from praying, 
either individually or in groups. Students may voluntarily pray together, provided 
such prayer is not done with school participation or supervision.191 
 
In its analysis, the appellate court explained the Establishment Clause’s limits on a 
coach’s free exercise.  With regard to employee participation in prayer, the school district 
contended that it cannot prevent its employees from participating in student prayers without 
violating their employees’ rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, freedom of 
association, and academic freedom.192  The court disagreed with the school district’s 
argument and upheld the district court’s prohibition.193  It noted that “the principle that 
government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the 
fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”194  The court found this 
“particularly true in the . . . context of basketball practices and games.”195   The court 
reasoned that the prayers took place during school-controlled, curriculum-related activities 
that members of the team were required to attend.196  Because coaches and other school 
employees are representative of the school and its policies, the coach’s prayers improperly 
entangled the school district in religion and indicated an unconstitutional endorsement of 
 
190 Id. at 405. 
191 Id. at 405-06. 
192 Id. at 406. 
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194 Id.; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992). 




religion.197 Accordingly, the court found that the school district’s employees and agents 
were properly enjoined from participating in student-initiated prayers.198 
In contrast to the approach by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which 
focused on how a coach’s prayers may improperly entangle a school district in religion, 
the Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit focused on how a coach’s prayers may 
cause a reasonable observer to perceive it as an endorsement of religion in Borden v. School 
District of the Township of East Brunswick.199  In 2008, a football coach, Marcus Borden, 
sued his school district, claiming that the district’s prohibition of faculty and coaches 
participating in prayer violated his rights to free speech, academic freedom, freedom of 
association, and due process.200  Borden was the head football coach at East Brunswick 
High School.201  During his time as head coach, he led the team in prayer before games and 
at the weekly team dinner where players, parents, and cheerleaders were present.202  From 
2003-2005, Borden led the prayer at the first team dinner of every season and then selected 
a senior player to do so in the subsequent weeks.203  Additionally, Borden would ask the 
assistant coaches and players to take a knee as he led them in prayer before each game.204 
In 2005, parents complained to the Superintendent about the prayer at the team dinner; 
one player even indicated that he was uncomfortable and afraid that Borden would call on 
 
197 Id.; see also Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir.1991) (“[a] teacher’s [religious] speech can be taken 
as directly and deliberately representative of the school”); Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251 (1990) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (EAA valid because it 
expressly forbids teacher participation and “avoids the problems of "the students' emulation of teachers as role 
models.’”).  
198 Doe, 70 F.3d at 405-06. 
199 Borden v. School District of the Township of East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008). 
200 Id. at 158-59. 
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him to lead the prayer.205  In a memo to Borden and all faculty members, the Superintendent 
reminded all faculty and staff that students have a constitutionally protected right to pray 
at school so long as it did not interfere with the “normal operations of the school or 
district.”206  However, the Superintendent noted, representatives of the school or school 
district (teachers, coaches, administrators, board members, etc.) “were prohibited from 
encourag[ing,] lead[ing,] initiat[ing,] mandat[ing,] or otherwise coercing student prayer, 
either directly or indirectly,” during school time or at any school sponsored event.207  
Borden temporarily resigned but soon after returned and filed suit against the district.208  
Prior to the commencement of the 2006 football season, Borden asked his team captains to 
talk to all of the members of the team to determine if they wanted to continue prayer before 
team dinners and games.209  The team voted to continue the pre-meal and pre-game 
prayers.210  Accordingly, while Borden no longer led his players in prayer, he continued to 
bow his head before team meals and take a knee before each game.211 
First, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the limitations of the First 
Amendment for coaches and other public-school employees.  The court stated, “The day 
has long since passed when individuals surrendered their right to freedom of speech by 
accepting public employment.”212  However, such rights are not without limitation.  Borden 
argued that his speech (bowing his head and taking a knee) was protected by the First 
 
205 Id. at 159-60. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 160-61. 
208 Id. at 162. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id.  at 162. Note that because Borden discontinued other acts of religious expression with players, the court here 
considered only Borden’s acts of bowing his head and taking a knee. 
212 Id. at 168 (quoting Sanguini v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 396 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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Amendment’s freedoms, including freedom of speech.213  However, the court concluded 
that the coach’s speech was not protected speech.214  Rather, the court concluded that 
Borden’s conduct violated the Establishment Clause using the Endorsement Test.215  In 
reaching their conclusion the court looked to how a reasonable observer familiar with the 
history and context of the religious display would perceive Borden’s actions.216  The court 
evaluated not only Borden’s bowing of his head before pre-game meals and taking a knee 
in the locker room, but also considered Borden’s lengthy history of engaging in religious 
activities with the team.217  The court found that his involvement as “an organizer, 
participant, and a leader . . . would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that he was 
endorsing religion.”  218  However, the court noted that “[w]ithout Borden’s twenty-three 
years of organizing, participating in, and leading prayer with his team, this conclusion 
would not be so clear… .”219  Despite ruling against Borden, the Third Circuit contemplated 
that a circumstance in which a coach bowing his head or taking a knee out of respect during 
a time of student-initiated prayer may not violate the Establishment Clause.  The court went 
on to state:   
If a football coach, who had never engaged in prayer with his team, were to bow 
his head and take a knee while his team engaged in a moment of reflection or prayer, 
we would likely reach a different conclusion because the same history and context 
of endorsing religion would not be present.220   
 
213 Id. at 163. 
214 Id. at 171. The court concluded that that Borden’s speech was not a matter of public concern because it occurred 
in private settings, such as the pre-game dinner and locker room and it was intended for the football players (and their 
parents) only. Also, the speech was not protected under academic freedom because his speech was intended to be a 
pedagogic method, rendering him a “proxy” for the school district. 
215 Id. at 175 (finding it unnecessary to analyze Borden’s actions using the coercion test or the Lemon test because his 
conduct obviously violated the Establishment Clause using the endorsement test). 
216 Id. (citing Modrovich v. Allegheny Cty., Pa., 385 F.3d 397, 401 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
217 Id. at 176-77. 
218 Id. at 176. 
219 Id. at 178. 
220 Id. at 178-79. 
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      Next, the court considered whether the school district had the right to adopt the prayer 
policies in an effort to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.  The court found that the 
school district’s guidelines and prayer policies were not facially unconstitutional and did 
not violate Borden’s constitutional rights.221  The court reiterated that it has held that where 
an official at a public school does not have a First Amendment right to his or her expression, 
the school district’s policy need not be “reasonably related to a legitimate educational 
interest.”222  Thus, because Borden had no First Amendment right to his expression, the 
Court needed not to analyze the policy under that standard.223  Nevertheless, it chose to go 
through with the analysis to demonstrate that the school district had a right to adopt its 
policy because it has a legitimate educational interest of avoiding Establishment Clause 
violations and that the prayer policy guidelines were reasonably related to that interest.224  
The Supreme Court has stated that “compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state 
interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech.”225   
C. Silent Prayer in Public School Policy 
 
221 Id. at 165-66. 
222 Id. at 174 (citing Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998)). Note that the court determined 
that this analysis was unnecessary since the policy was not unconstitutional on its face and did not violate Borden’s 
fundamental rights.  Nevertheless, it chose to go through with the analysis to demonstrate that the school district has 
a legitimate educational interest of avoiding Establishment Clause violations and that the prayer policy guidelines 
were reasonably related to that interest. See also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
841-42 (1995) (stating that, in considering pre-emptive regulations, the state must have a “plausible fear” of being 
associated with religion or a particular religion, and there must be a “likelihood that the speech in question is being 
either endorsed or coerced by the State.”); Tucker v. Cal. Dept. of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1213 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a blanket ban on all employee religious speech or expression went beyond what was necessary to protect the State 
from Establishment Clause violations because “[t]he challenged regulation here prohibits all sorts of employee speech 
that could in no way create the impression that the state has taken a position in support of a religious sect or of religion 
generally.”). 
223 Borden v. School District of the Township of East Brunswick, 523 F.3d at 174. 
224 Id. at 761-62. 
225 Id. at 761-62 (citing Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761-62; see also Locke v. 
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 729 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[a] State has a compelling interest in not committing actual 
Establishment Clause violations.”). 
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Silent prayers adopted by the students themselves or implemented by the state for secular 
purposes can cultivate an environment where voluntary, uncoerced, individualized reflection prior 
to the start of public-school athletic contests can thrive in locker rooms and on sidelines.  Silent 
prayers that are sponsored by the government, however, can still violate the Establishment Clause. 
In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama Statute which authorized a one 
minute period of silence in all public schools “for meditation or voluntary prayer” was a law 
respecting the establishment of religion.226  The Court stated that “[a] system which secures the 
right to proselytize religions, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant 
right to decline to foster such concepts.”227  The Court instructed that “[t]he Establishment Clause, 
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental 
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether 
those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not.”228  The Court cited two 
reasons to justify its finding of no secular purpose.  First, the law replaced an earlier moment-of-
silence law that had not mentioned prayer; because that earlier law already protected the right to 
pray (without saying so), the purpose of the later law had to be to “endorse” and “promote” 
prayer.229  Second, the majority also relied on statements by the law’s sponsor, State Senator 
Donald Holmes, that the law’s purpose was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools.230  
Thus, the statute was struck down because it did not have a secular purpose and the motivation for 
passing the statute was to advance religion.231  To be a valid moment of silence, the practice has 
 
226 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985). 
227 Id. at 51. 
228 Id. at 60.  
229 Id. at 59. 
230 Id. at 57. But see id. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Holmes’ statements were made after the law was enacted, a 
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231 Id. at 56-7. 
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to be adopted with purely secular intentions.232  While the statute in Wallace could not withstand 
scrutiny based upon an analysis of the actual statutory language, the reason behind the statute, or 
its practice, members of the Court appear to have agreed that properly implemented moment of-
silence laws could be constitutional.233 
V. Solution: A Properly Implemented Moment of Silence Policy in Public School 
The Muscular Christianity movement left an indelible impact on the relationship between sport 
and religion.  Its pervasive influence inspires the religious spirit of student-athletes and coaches 
while challenging the extent to which religious devotional prayer should be permitted in public-
school athletic contests.  As can be derived from caselaw and modern-day controversies that 
surround religious devotional prayer in public-school athletic contests, anything less than a 
properly implemented moment of silence policy would require strict adherence to the First 
Amendment. 
Coach-initiated prayer, student-initiated prayer, and government endorsed prayer policies 
highlight the conflicts of the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses in the context 
of public-school athletic contests.  Regarding coach-initiated prayer, a coach’s initiation of or 
participation in prayer may improperly entangle the school district in religion and indicate an 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion because coaches are viewed as representatives of the 
 
232 Id. at 67 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
233 See id. at 59 (“The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different from merely 
protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the 
schoolday.”); Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[s]ome moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional.”); Id. at 
72-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Scholars and at least one Member of this Court have recognized the distinction 
and suggested that a moment of silence in public schools would be constitutional.”); see also Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963); (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he observance of a moment of reverent silence at 
the opening of class” may serve “the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either 
the religious liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of 
religion and government.”). 
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school and its policies.234  Regarding student-initiated prayer, the Supreme Court has recognized 
broad protection for voluntary student prayer in public schools.  In Santa Fe, the student-athlete’s 
religious freedom is only infringed upon, as it was by the school district’s policy, when the State 
affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.235  Moreover, a school policy 
addressing prayer in public-school athletic contests that is improperly implemented may prevent a 
student-athlete’s ability to freely exercise their right to pray or, conversely, may impose mandatory 
prayer on a nonreligious student-athlete.  In each scenario, a government or government actor’s 
involvement can deprive coaches and student-athletes of the genuine, meaningful choice of 
whether to engage in religious devotional prayer.  However, in reconciling the above, there is a 
solution that would simultaneously achieve both free exercise and non-establishment of religion.  
In Santa Fe, the Court did not hold that a school district can never create a limited public forum 
for “private” student speech; the Court concluded that nothing in the Constitution as interpreted 
by the Court prohibits any public-school student from voluntarily praying before, during, or after 
the school day.236  To this end, the Supreme Court appears to have also agreed that properly 
implemented moment of silence policies and laws could be constitutional in the public-school 
context.237  Therefore, a properly implemented moment of silence policy in public schools is the 
solution to simultaneously achieve both free exercise and non-establishment of religion.   
The most constitutionally permissible approach to allowing prayer in locker rooms and on 
sidelines would be for a public-school district to properly implement a moment of silence policy.  
This moment of silence policy would be a voluntary, uncoerced, and neutral policy implemented 
 
234 See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 
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236 Id. 
237 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
38 
 
for the secular purpose of furthering individualized reflection prior to the start of public-school 
athletic contests.  A school policy that permits a moment of silence means that individuals can 
pray in the locker rooms and on the sidelines without compromising one’s free exercise of religion, 
jeopardizing the religious liberties of others, or disrespecting the required degree of separation 
between church and state.  Accordingly, such school policy would neither impinge on a student-
athlete’s rights to make the choice to pray nor curtail a coach’s right to effectively motivate his or 
her team.  The practice of reflecting, meditating, and praying are each products of a genuine, 
private choice.  Particularly, a school policy permitting a moment of silence to be observed before 
an athletic contest in which a student may, if the student chooses, reflect, pray, or meditate, allows 
a student to make a genuine, private choice — to reflect and “get in the zone” however they may 
choose to do so, or not to do so, at all.  If a coach or student-athlete opts to use that moment of 
silence to pray, then that is their genuine, private choice.  Accordingly, properly implemented 
“moment of silence” policies are effective because coaches and student-athletes will not know 
whether their peers use the silent moment for inner reflection, meditation, or prayer. 
VI. Conclusion 
A government’s denial of prayer is just as unconstitutional as a government’s endorsement of 
prayer.  Just as there is room for play in the joints between the Religion Clauses, there is room to 
achieve constitutionality in the incorporation of religious devotional prayer in public-school 
athletic contests.  Both free exercise and non-establishment can be achieved through a properly 
implemented moment of silence.  Such moment of silence would be voluntary, uncoerced, and 
neutral for the secular purpose of furthering individualized reflection prior to the start of public-
school athletic contests.   
39 
 
Firstly, this practice would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.  The practice of reflecting, 
meditating, and praying are each products of a genuine, private choice.  Therefore, a school policy 
permitting a moment of silence to be observed before an athletic contest in which a coach or 
student-athlete may, as they choose, reflect, pray, or meditate, allows a coach or student-athlete to 
make a genuine, private choice — to reflect and “get in the zone” however they may choose to do 
so, or not to do so, at all.  If a coach or student-athlete opts to use that moment of silence to pray, 
then that is their genuine, private choice.  Such a policy would neither impinge on a student-
athlete’s rights to make the choice to pray nor curtail a coach’s right to effectively motivate his or 
her team.   
Secondly, this practice would not violate the Establishment Clause.  A school policy permitting 
a moment of silence to be observed before an athletic contest cannot be misconstrued as endorsing 
or advancing a particular religious practice.  The purpose of a moment of silence policy is secular 
and neutral in nature; the purpose is to further individualized reflection prior to the start of public-
school athletic contests.  The moment allows a student-athlete to make a genuine, private choice 
as to how he or she will use that time, and the student may or may not use that time to pray.  
Therefore, a moment of silence policy reinforced by a secular purpose and a genuine, private 
choice breaks any causal chain of a potential Establishment Clause violation. 
In conclusion, a properly implemented moment of silence policy in public schools may be the 
ultimate “Hail Mary” that is needed to achieve constitutionality of prayer in the modern-day pews 
that are sidelines and locker rooms. 
 
